Washington, D.C., January 25, 2024 - Declassified highest-level records from the Moscow summit 30 years ago this month detail U.S. President Bill Clinton’s strong personal support for Russian President Boris Yeltsin, their close cooperation on security issues, and deep concern about Yeltsin backtracking on economic reforms newly understood by the Clinton team as too “harsh” on the Russian people.
The documents include verbatim transcripts of Clinton’s two “one-on-one” discussions with Yeltsin, their trilateral discussion with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk about removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, the detailed report from the U.S. Embassy Moscow on the dinner thrown by Yeltsin at his official dacha for Clinton, and the transcript of the expanded bilateral discussion between Clinton and Yeltsin on security issues.
The e-book includes an overview briefing memo for the President from national security adviser Anthony Lake, which describes Yeltsin as “arguably your most important foreign counterpart,” and the economic briefing memo to Clinton that admits that market reforms urged by the U.S. and implemented by Yeltsin failed to provide a social safety net for Russians, who reacted by voting against the reformers in the December 1993 parliamentary elections.
One highlight among the documents from January 1994 is the 12-page “eyes only” memo from Strobe Talbott to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, with Christopher’s extensive handwritten comments in the margins, including the admission that “set speeches” were “a real weakness” of his. Just a few days after being nominated to be Christopher’s deputy, a major promotion after less than one year as ambassador for the former Soviet republics, Talbott provides his boss with an almost anthropological account of Washington’s foreign policy village, with candid commentary on Russia and NATO policies (and their critics), on State Department personnel issues, and on internal tensions in the Clinton team. These included Lake’s “runs” at “knocking me out of Presidential events on Russia,” such as the upcoming Moscow one-on-ones.[1]
The new documents come from two major sources: a successful National Security Archive lawsuit against the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act and multiple declassification review requests filed at the Clinton Presidential Library. These records are highlights from the forthcoming 2,500-document declassified reference collection: U.S.-Russian Relations from the End of the Soviet Union to the Rise of Vladimir Putin, the next installment in the award-winning Digital National Security Archive series published by ProQuest.
The documents show the American team working hard to include multiple non-Yeltsin-centered events in the summit schedule. The U.S. ambassador, Thomas Pickering, hosted a reception at Spaso House for Clinton to meet oppositionists, excluding only Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the extremist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the top vote-getter in the December legislative election. Clinton also addressed an audience of young Russians at the Ostankino television complex and met with the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, who had attempted to mediate the constitutional crisis between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet the previous year.[2]
Two of the documents, the Clinton-Kravchuk memcon at Kyiv’s Borispol Airport and the trilateral memcon with Clinton, Yeltsin and Kravchuk in Moscow, mark a key moment in the history of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Traumatized by the 1986 Chernobyl explosion, the Ukrainian independence movement had pushed to remove Soviet nuclear weapons from Ukraine, and the newly independent state signed the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992 to become a non-nuclear party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which also inherited Soviet nukes). Ukraine had no capacity to service and maintain the nuclear warheads—which were reaching the end of their service lives and were thus mini-Chernobyls waiting to happen—and couldn’t afford to build a nuclear reprocessing cycle (the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences’ estimate was $3 billion), especially with the international sanctions that would have ensued.[3]
In order to remove the nukes, Ukraine needed compensation and security assurances; at the same time, some voices in the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, argued for keeping the nukes. The Moscow summit documents, including the Trilateral Statement signed by the three leaders, show the first steps towards the ultimate deal. The U.S. put up $60 million to prime the pump; the Russians provided fuel assemblies blended down from warhead fissile material to fuel Ukrainian nuclear power plants; and the Ukrainians started shipping warheads to the Russians for reprocessing. Ukraine also received debt forgiveness for hundreds of millions of dollars in already supplied Russian oil and gas and security assurances that lasted until 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, in 2022, popularized the notion that Ukraine should have kept its nukes, but the record shows that maintaining a nuclear arsenal wasn’t really an option for the country in 1994.[4]
The biggest worry among the Clinton team at the Moscow summit was not so much the Ukraine trilateral but the fate of economic and democratic reforms in Russia after the shock of the December elections. During the opening dinner at Yeltsin’s dacha on January 13, the Russian president referred to the leading reformer, former prime minister Yegor Gaidar, as the leader of the government party in the Duma, “clearly impl[ying] that Gaidar would be out of the government and work only in the Duma.” The next day, during the formal Kremlin dinner, Clinton’s aides heard from Gaidar that, actually, he was being fired, and others of his team were also on their way out. At the insistence of Treasury undersecretary Larry Summers, Clinton sought a final one-on-one with Yeltsin on January 15 to warn that “President Clinton’s credibility was connected to President Yeltsin’s indication that he would continue the reforms, which were linked to a specific team of people.” But, of course, that was for Yeltsin to decide.[5]